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Resisting the Devil's Instruments: Early Modem Resistance Theory for Late Modem Times David P. Henreckson 
In the midst of religious conflict in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, a number of prominent Protestant �heologians and lawyers wrote on 
the collective moral obligation to resist systemic injustice. My essay focuses 
on Johannes Althusius, who offers a theological account of the political com­
munity and its obligation to preserve the ·common good and resist injustice. 
Thinking alongside Althusius, I will consider not only the conditions that may 
prompt acts of resistance but also the lawful means and ends of resistance. In 
other words, how might resistance be carripd out rightly? By whom? And to 
what end? Finally, I argue that we have good reasons to use Althusius's politi­
cal thought to revive an account of resistance that is internal to the Christian 
theological tradition-an account that relies on a broader conception of divine 
justice, covenantal responsibility, and mutual accountability. THEGODOF THEEARLYMODERNREFORM EDTRADITIONH AS sometimes been described as a Leviathan: all-powerful, unaccountable, and utterly free in his dealings with humanity. His chief end is the increase of his own glory. His covenants are made apart from any prior recognition of good­ness or merit, depending solely on his sovereign whim. The political theorist Carl Schmitt, in one of his lesser-known works, went so far as to link the rise of covenant theology in the Reformed tradition with the political absolutism of Thomas Hobbes's famously controversial treatise Leviathan. According to Schmitt-who is not alone in this judgment-what the early modern absolut­ists and the early modern Calvinists share is a commitment to the raw, absolute, unqualified, and unchecked power of the sovereign, whether human or divine. To put it in simple terms, the divine Leviathan of the Calvinists begat the hu­man Leviathan of the early modern nation-state.I This narrative, in my judgment, is both too tidy and too provincial to be true. I have addressed the historical inaccuracy of this interpretation elsewhere.2 
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At present, my focus is more direct and limited. My first aim in this essay is 
to show that there is a prominent strand of early Reformed thought that runs 
directly contrary to the absolutist narrative we have received from Schmitt and 
others. In fact, I argue that it is the early Reformed tradition, represented here 
by the important but neglected figure of Johannes Althusius, that gives us one of 
the earliest examples of a radical, modern, and theological defense of collective 
political resistance to unjust power.3
My second aim is to show how this early modem Protestant tradition offers 
resources to analyze not only the conditions that prompt acts of resistance but 
also the lawful means and ends of resistance. In other words, how might resis- 
tance be carried out rightly? By whom? And to what end?
My final aim is less historical and more constructive. Many recent works in 
political theology and Christian ethics invoke the theme of resistance as central 
to the work of social criticism. However, many of these accounts reflect the 
disciplinary influence of recent social theory rather than theological ethics. As 
a result, they sometimes lack the orienting normative concerns that have his- 
torically motivated Christian ethicists and moral theologians. I wish to use the 
resources of Althusius,s political thought and this neglected radical strand of 
the Protestant tradition to revive an account of resistance that is internal to the 
Christian theological tradition—an account that relies on a broader conception 
of divine justice, covenantal responsibility, and mutual accountability. Simply 
put, Althusius and his contemporaries can offer us something that social theo- 
rists like Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler—for all their 
insights—cannot: an account of radical politics that is both theologically rich 
and historically grounded in the Protestant tradition.
The Problem of Resistance
In the Christian tradition, theological reflection on the possibility of political 
resistance to injustice extends back at least to Thomas Aquinas and Augustine, 
not to mention the ancient and late antique sources that informed their views. 
Sketched in very broad terms, the premodern theological tradition acknowl- 
edged that all political authority derives from God, following Paul’s argument 
in the locus classicus of Romans 13. “Political powers do not bear the sword 
for no reason,” and Christian subjects have a divine mandate to obey them. At 
the same time, premodern theologians were fully aware of exceptional cases. 
Tyrants, demagogues, and oligarchs are not a modern invention, of course. 
What should Christians do when confronted by tyrants and their perverted 
systems of governance? Premodern theologians argued that, while political 
subjects are generally obligated to obey the command of a political superior 
as if it came from God, the command is morally binding only if it is just and
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lawful. A magistrate’s command to commit theft, murder, or any other act 
prohibited by the moral law must not be obeyed. In this sense, what I will call a 
passive or indirect form of resistance would be considered legitimate. Aquinas 
even goes so far as to suggest the legitimacy of some sort of political resistance 
to tyranny: “A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not 
to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler. . . . Consequently, 
there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind.”4 Aquinas does 
not, however, provide an account of the mechanism for popular resistance, nor 
does he articulate a doctrine of popular sovereignty that would support such a 
collective undertaking.5
If we look ahead to the first and second generation of Protestant reform- 
ers, we can find this account (which I am generically calling the premodern 
view) well represented among the leading Protestant theologians. For instance, 
like Aquinas and other premodems, John Calvin allows that Christians might 
resist an unjust authority through indirect means. They might call on lesser 
magistrates to intervene on their behalf. They might repent of whatever sin 
prompted God to judge them with the scourge of tyranny in the first place. 
They might flee the country (this was of course a common occurrence during 
the religious wars of the sixteenth century). Or they might simply choose not 
to obey the unjust command and prepare themselves for the consequences. 
Still, Calvin thinks the subject may not actively, or direcdy, resist the office of 
civil mle itself. To resist directly, by force of arms, would be to upset the whole 
order of divine-human governance. This sort of action would be an impiety 
that welcomes chaos.6
According to Calvin and the premodern tradition, therefore, a Christian 
subject might choose not to obey an unjust command, and she might choose 
not to participate in an unjust political system, but she would have no means 
to chasten or contest the system itself. This sort of resistance to structural sins 
and injustice is prohibited. The sword belongs to the divinely appointed human 
sovereign, who alone is the agent of divine wrath and justice.
An Early Modern Solution to the Problem of Resistance
By the turn of the seventeenth century, many Reformed thinkers had become 
discontent with a merely indirect doctrine of resistance. The reasons for this 
shift are many, but one of the most important turning points was the massacre 
of thousands—perhaps tens of thousands—of French Protestants in the weeks 
following St. Bartholomew’s Day in 1572. Suspicions ran deep that members 
of the French royal family were involved in plotting the horrific event. The 
historians Harro Höpfl and Martyn Thompson mark the massacre as the piv- 
otal moment that forced early Protestant political thinkers to develop a more
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comprehensive doctrine of resistance centered on the theological concepts of 
covenant and contract.7 Prior to the massacre, leading Protestants had hoped to 
persuade the French royal family to embrace a policy of toleration. Theodore 
Beza, Calvin’s successor in Geneva, appeared repeatedly before the French 
court over many years, pleading the Huguenot cause in the face of what he saw 
as unjust persecution: “Sire, it belongs to the Church of God, in whose name 
I speak, to endure blows and not to inflict them. But it will also please your 
Majesty to remember that she is an anvil that has worn out many hammers.”8 
Beza’s metaphor has an ominous subdety about it, but even this threat of divine 
vengeance rang hollow in the aftermath of the massacre. An indirect doctrine 
of resistance no longer sufficed. As Höpfl puts it, the massacre in 1572 “effec- 
tively meant the end of the project for an evangelical conversion of the whole 
of France: the issue now was survival.”9
Reformed thinkers such as Beza, and later Althusius, began asking whether 
there might be certain unjust actions that a political ruler could commit that 
would not only negate any moral obligations to obey her command but also—if 
sufficiendy unjust or impious—divest her of office. And if there were such acts, 
how would we recognize them?
Beza attempted to answer these questions in his treatise On the Right ofMagis- 
trates, written soon after the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. Following the pre- 
modem tradition before him, Beza claimed that whenever a political ruler issues 
an immoral command, one that directs his subjects to commit injustice or impi- 
ety, the command lacks binding force. Up to this point, we have not progressed 
any further than Aquinas, Calvin, and the preceding theological tradition.
However, Beza then goes on to criticize absolutist theorists—that is, pro- 
ponents of arbitrary and absolute power—arguing that they “so far exalt the 
authority of kings and supreme rulers as to dare maintain that they have no 
other judge but God alone to whom they have to render account {rationem red- 
dere) of their deeds.”10 In other words, the absolutists acknowledge that princes 
may sin and perpetrate injustice in the political community, but they assume 
that only God has the authority and agency to chasten and correct an unbridled 
magistrate. The people may pray for divine help. They may call on other politi- 
cal powers to intervene. But that is all. Beza, however, is not content to leave 
it at this. In fact, he thinks that the idea that an unjust magistrate is answerable 
only to God is utter folly and impiety. So he asks his readers: “Is there no other 
remedy for injustice?”11
Both Beza and Althusius believe that other remedies do exist, and that these 
remedies may be not merely permissible but even at times obligatory. Beza 
answers his own question directly: “I deny that ... it [is] illicit for a people 
oppressed by obvious tyranny to protect themselves from their enemy by just 
remedies, in addition to prayer and penitence.”12 What these just remedies 
are, beyond seeking the help of other civil or foreign magistrates, is not always
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clear. What is significant, though, is the fact that Beza reclassifies the unjust 
magistrate as the “enemy” of the oppressed people. By retitling the person who 
formerly held the office of “prince” as an “enemy,” Beza has found a way around 
the received interpretation of Romans 13 and other scriptural texts that require 
Christians to obey political authorities. Christian subjects should of course obey 
their princes and kings, Beza argues, but why should they be expected to obey 
their enemies?
Beza does not provide much detail about how to identify the moment at 
which a legitimate prince becomes a tyrannical adversary. However, if we now 
turn to Johannes Althusius, we can find a thoroughly theological answer to 
Beza’s question. First, however, recall the precise terms of Beza’s criticism of 
his absolutist rivals. Proponents of absolute power argued that earthly princes 
were accountable only to God. No matter how heinous the offense, only the 
divine sovereign may call earthly rulers to account. Beza suggests that this is a 
false, perhaps even impious, doctrine; however, he does not offer an extensive 
alternative account. Althusius does.
In his most influential work, a treatise titled Política Methodice Digesta, Al- 
thusius picks up the thread of Beza’s argument.13 When the absolutists claim 
that earthly princes are accountable only to God, Althusius argues, they of- 
fer us a false hierarchy of political relations. According to the absolutists, the 
prince owes obedience to God, as do the people, but both parties are “debtors 
to God alone.” In other words, there is no covenantal accountability horizon- 
tally, between earthly rulers and the people—only vertically, between the divine 
sovereign and the earthly ruler.14
According to Althusius, who follows Beza in this regard, this is an unjust 
and even impious political doctrine. Drawing on his own Reformed theological 
tradition, Althusius argues that God enters into a mutual covenant with both 
the prince and the people. All are unified in the same covenantal fellowship; 
therefore, within the terms of this fellowship, the prince and the people are also 
obligated to render justice to each other and to God for the sake of the common 
good. In other words, the people have at least as much of a stake in the political 
covenant as the prince. The people, alongside the prince, are codebtors before 
God, responsible for pursuing justice in the political community.15
But exacdy how might the political community go about identifying what this 
justice looks like? What is the standard for right relations between the politi- 
cal ruler and his subjects? Althusius’s initial answer is deeply theological and 
also runs quite to the contrary of the stereotyped picture of the Calvinist God 
offered by Schmitt and others. He argues, if we want to distinguish just from 
unjust political relationships, we must look to the paradigmatic relationship 
between the divine sovereign and his creatures. God is the perfecdy good law- 
giver who issues directives for the well-being—or salvation—of his people. The 
terms of this relationship find their rationale in the faithful love of the sovereign
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for his people and their fulfillment, first, in the people’s recognition of God’s 
goodness and, second, in their reciprocating love for God and neighbor. God 
would not, and in fact could not, be unfaithful or unjust to his beloved people. 
Althusius applies this point to the political order by means of an a fortiori argu- 
ment: if even God, who is all-powerful, cannot sin by acting against what is just 
in relation to his creatures, how much more is the earthly ruler bound to this 
standard?16 No just power can be absolute. No good power can be arbitrary.
What happens then if a prince acts unjustly, breaks covenant, and the prayers 
and patience of the people go unanswered? What happens when power-hungry 
popes, priests, oligarchs, and magistrates arbitrarily dominate their subjects, 
destroying the proper goods and fellowship that individuals ought to be able 
to enjoy together? The conditions are such that the social bonds that ought to 
provide for the mutual enjoyment and communication of goods no longer exist. 
Althusius, like Beza, names this condition as tyranny.
Here, at last, we arrive at Althusius’s primary innovation, the point at which he 
is willing to go beyond what I have termed the doctrine of indirect resistance that 
had long been part of the premodern theological tradition. In effect, Althusius 
identifies the people themselves—and not their rulers and magistrates—as the 
principal human party of the covenant, the party who bears the primary respon- 
sibility for preserving right order. As a collective, covenanted body, the people 
have authority—given to them by God himself—to hold tyrannical princes to 
account. They may hold an unjust ruler responsible, name his sins publicly, call 
for repentance, and even authorize public “vindicators” to mount an armed resis- 
tance to an “incurable” tyrant. According to these terms, magistrates and rulers 
are merely administrators or stewards of the political community and its common 
goods. And as administrators, they may be deposed as the people see fit.
This new conception of popular political agency carries with it a rather 
strenuous moral obligation: we are all mutually bound to seek the common 
good and to challenge those figures or institutions that break covenant and 
twist our shared forms of fife toward unjust ends. In fact, Althusius claims, the 
people—as codebtor before God—are “held responsible for the fault” of the 
prince and “[share] his sins” if they do not hold the covenant-breaker account- 
able and “resist and impede him” so far as possible. God, the initiating party to 
the covenant, stands as vindicator: “He will cast Israel down because of the sins 
of Jeroboam.”17
How to Recognize Tyranny
It is one thing to claim that it is legitimate for the people to resist an unjust 
ruler. It is another matter to have the practical wisdom to identify a tyrannical 
ruler and the forms of systemic injustice that give rise to such a figure. I noted in
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the previous section that Beza, Althusius, and others made a normative distinc- 
tion between a true ruler and a tyrant.18 Resistance is prohibited in the former 
case but permitted—potentially—in the latter.
For Althusius, as we have already seen in some detail, tyranny is defined 
as the contrary of just and morally upright political rule. In other words, it 
is the privation of good rule: “Through tyranny, the foundations and bonds 
{vincula) of the covenantal fellowship are bbstinately, persistently, and incur- 
ably destroyed and overthrown, against the ruler’s pledged faith and professed 
oath.”19 Althusius, like earlier proponents of resistance, denies that a ruler who 
perpetrates these tyrannical conditions is the sort of ruler that Paul has in mind 
in the epistle to the Romans. A tyrant is not a minister of God but is better 
described as an instrument of the devil {sed diaboli instrumentant dicitur).20 What 
is owed to this sort of ruler?
For Althusius, this is not just a rhetorical question, and his answer is not 
as straightforward as we might have expected. We might expect Althusius to 
authorize any and all acts of resistance to someone he describes as diabolical. 
Or perhaps we might assume that the existence of tyranny puts an end to pre- 
existing social commitments and moral norms, essentially authorizing popular 
revolution. But Althusius’s answer is more complex.
In an appendix to the Política, added in the second edition in 1610, Althusius 
analyzes the various species of tyrannical rule so that his readers can better 
identify the right response in particular cases. Tyrants may be instruments of 
the devil, but not all diabolical agents are the same, nor should they be resisted 
each in the same way. Here Althusius reminds his readers that not all failures 
or imperfections of rule are tantamount to tyranny—or, to be more precise, 
tyranny in its absolute or paradigmatic sense. In less extreme cases, Althusius 
cautions, virtuous citizens should not act rashly. Some rulers may be unjust in 
one aspect of their office but not others. Some rulers may suffer from a failure 
of will in performing their duties. And others may have started down a tyranni- 
cal path but may still be turned away from their destination by wise counselors. 
Many individual sins and imperfections can and should be tolerated in order 
to preserve political fellowship. Althusius draws an analogy between political 
and marital covenantal relationships: the individual sins of a magistrate do not 
necessarily abrogate his authority in se, “just as a marriage is not dissolved by 
every misdeed committed by one spouse against another, except for adultery, 
since this is directly contrary to the nature” of the fellowship.21
To determine the right responses to political injustice, therefore, we have 
to consider tyranny in its various forms. Borrowing from earlier Protestant and 
medieval sources, Althusius distinguishes between “fundamental” and “admin- 
istrative” tyranny. The former concerns the foundational laws, religious oaths, 
and social bonds that make the community a cohesive political body.22 We 
might describe this as constitutional tyranny, or tyranny in extremis, in which
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the tyrant breaks the oath she made to the political community—and to God— 
thereby destroying the social order and impeding the relevant public figures 
from the performance of their duties.23 If a ruler were to commit treason, for 
instance, or plot against her own people, such actions would violate the very 
foundation of the political order.
The second form of tyranny concerns the unjust or impious administration 
of the community’s goods. It is much more common and takes more compli- 
cated forms than the first. In this species of tyranny, the ruler is still technically 
fulfilling his office, serving as administrator of the goods of society, but doing 
so in a perverse way—at the expense of his people. The improper administra- 
tion of goods might be general in nature, as in the exercise of absolute power, 
or more specific. Althusius here provides a catalog of vices and behaviors that 
characterize this latter form of administrative tyranny. This catalog provides 
examples to help his readers recognize injustice when it is cloaked under some 
other description. Among other things, the tyrant is one who corrupts social 
practices, luxuriates in material comforts at public cost, permits crimes to go 
unpunished, and nourishes factions and wars to weaken the collective strength 
of his subjects.24 If this list sounds familiar to us today, Althusius would not be 
surprised: tyranny is a perennial condition that encroaches wherever a com- 
munity has become vicious or unvigilant.
Identifying Tyranny's Remedies
Besides articulating the distinction between a true ruler and a tyrant, Althusius 
and others made a second breakthrough in early modern political thought: a 
new conception of popular political agency, supported by a theological account 
of divine power and goodness. The political community, as a whole, is autho- 
rized by God to hold the ruler to account. It may recognize certain persons, 
whether individual magistrates or an authorized assembly, as “public” figures 
with the authority to resist the unjust actions of a tyrant.
At the beginning of this essay, I noted that the premodern theological tra- 
dition had the resources to distinguish between just rule and tyrannical rule, 
even allowing that it may be permissible for someone—it is not entirely clear 
who—to contest the latter. However, the premodem theological tradition did 
not offer an explicit account of how legitimate acts of resistance might be car- 
ried out, nor did it have a doctrine of popular political agency—as Althusius 
does—which would authorize the political community to engage in these acts.
While I have argued that Althusius and many of his Protestant peers did 
make political and theological advances on these points, we still need to consider 
the mechanisms for resistance. In other words, how might a people go about 
resisting a tyrant and various forms of structural injustice? More precisely, how
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might a people resist tyranny in a just and righteous manner so they do not fall 
prey to the temptations of absolute and arbitrary power?
Early modern theologians like Althusius and Beza were fully conscious of 
the temptations that often accompany acts of social and political resistance. 
The tyrant is an existential threat to the political community, but some acts of 
resistance may themselves threaten to undermine the common good of fellow- 
ship if carried out imprudently, rashly, or maliciously. Oftentimes it is better to 
endure unjust conditions in patient hope that acts of forbearance, rather than 
resistance, may better serve the common good of the community. If we resist 
wrongly, social trust breaks down, and the fellowship we hoped to preserve may 
instead wither away through our rashness.25
With these temptations in mind, it is important to consider the practicalities 
of resistance—a moral task that the early modern Protestants took quite seri- 
ously. This involves considering a series of practical, prudential questions of the 
following sort: Is this the right time or place to resist? What sort of resistance is 
called for? Will an act of resistance result in greater injustice than the present 
circumstances? What previous commitments and promises are relevant? To 
resist lawfully, we must be ready to make judgments on these matters.
Here is it crucial to emphasize that, for Althusius and even the most radical 
of his Reformed contemporaries, acts of resistance do not occur in anything like 
a Schmittian state of exception. Preexisting moral norms are not suspended, 
nor are the principles, institutions, and communal bonds that made the po- 
litical community something valuable in the first place. That is to say, acts of 
resistance are not acts of revolution but rather restoration. In fact, as I argue in 
the next section, acts of resistance may be judged as legitimate, in part, insofar 
as they aim at protecting the common good of fellowship in the community.
How, then, should we go about identifying the proper criteria of lawful 
resistance to various species of tyranny? To make these sorts of judgments, 
Althusius directs us toward a traditional form of moral inquiry: the criteria 
of lawful resistance are the who, what, where, when, and why of the action.26 
When considering the legitimacy of political resistance, as in traditional ac- 
counts of just war theory, each of these considerations bears on the rightness 
of the undertaking.
First, the who: there must be an authorized representative of the political 
community. Althusius, following Calvin and others, refers to this officer as an 
ephor, a lesser magistrate, or some authorized public agent. This public agent 
is someone who bears responsibility for resistance to injustice and to whom 
the people ought to join themselves, adding their own strength, resources, and 
counsel.27 Here it is crucial to note that when Althusius restricts acts of resis- 
tance to this class of public agents, he is not explicitly identifying a particular 
legal or political office. He is referring, rather, to a general species of public 
office that holds the supreme ruler to account for his or her actions. This
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species of public office may occupy a different place in the social hierarchy 
across different constitutional systems.28 In other words, the people may look 
to any number of public figures—a prince, a duke, a city elder, or any audio- 
rized assembly of the people—for vindication. The democratic implications 
of this last option may be more obvious to us than it was to Althusius, but it 
is worth underscoring.
Second, and immediately related to the first point, the what and where: ju- 
risdiction matters when determining the right course of action. “What is to be 
done collectively by the public agents,” Althusius argues, is best done through 
a deliberative process of mutual consent between the people and its authorized 
administrators. Deliberation must be careful, patient, and arrive at some sort 
of practical consensus. In other words, public figures must take care not to 
overstep their own authority and prosecute a tyrant in ways that go beyond 
their administrative purview or are disagreeable to the community’s represen- 
tatives.29 In straightforward terms, this means that public administrators must 
not act “beyond the boundaries” of the scope or scale of their office. At the 
same time, Althusius’s comments about jurisdiction reflect his belief that au- 
thoritative public action must arise from within the community. Correction and 
resistance are internal matters.
Third, the when: as the people go about identifying the right occasion to 
resist, and what measure of force should back up the act of resistance, several 
things must be considered. How serious and inflexible is the tyranny? Have all 
other remedies been exhausted? And how have the injustices of the tyrannical 
ruler been made public to the political community? On this final point, Althu- 
sius indicates that three forms of public recognition are central: recognition of 
tyranny’s existence, its extent, and the means by which the tyrant has previously 
been challenged. This last point is crucial for Althusius since there must be a 
record of admonishment and public correction prior to any formal act of fore- 
ible resistance. If these conditions are satisfied, as I detailed earlier, the unjust 
ruler must be held to account. Ideally, the public agents will call an assembly, 
but if they fail to do so, Althusius grants that “public avengers and deliverers 
should be constituted ad hoc by the people itself.”
Finally, the why: the rationale for lawful resistance is the restoration of fel- 
lowship. Althusius writes that a tyrant must be resisted so long as the unjust 
conditions endure, whether in words, deed, or dissembling, and so long as “he 
acts contrary to the declared covenant.” On these terms, lawful acts of resis- 
tance must continue “until the republic is returned to its original condition.”30 
The remedy of resistance aims at the restoration of health to the political body 
and perseveres until this end is accomplished. In other words, the people, hav- 
ing diagnosed the disease that plagues the body, may prescribe the appropriate 
remedy—even if that means deposing a tyrant, or calling for forcible resistance 
to unjust power.
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Early Modern Resistance and Late Modern Problems
What does this mean for contemporary theological ethics? Are there reasons to 
view these early modem ideas as something more than just historical relics? Is 
there still life in these traditional, white, European, Calvinist bones?
I want to draw out two practical, and I think increasingly relevant, impli- 
cations of early Reformed resistance theory for contemporary Christian eth- 
ics. The first implication concerns covenantal responsibility and arises out of 
Althusius’s doctrine of mutual accountability. As I argued earlier, if we read 
Althusius carefully, we will encounter a strenuous moral exhortation: individu- 
als cannot stand idly by when they witness systemic injustice in the church or 
political society. This may seem a trite moral maxim, easily endorsed by any 
right-thinking citizen. But I believe that Althusius’s point mns deeper than 
this. He means to implicate us in the deepest, most complicated sins of our 
communities—simply by virtue of our membership in these communities. In 
effect, he tells us, insofar as you take yourself to be—and are recognized as—a 
member of a particular community, you bear a covenantal responsibility for its 
goods and ills, its virtues and vices, its justice and injustice. By participating in 
the life of whatever community you belong to (by choice or by birth), you are 
under a relentless obligation to seek its good and to ensure that other members 
of the community are able to do likewise.
We often fail to fulfill this obligation, and in multiple ways. It may be rela- 
tively easy to identify the occasions in which we fall short by actively commit- 
ting injustice against a neighbor. It is more difficult, but no less important, 
to identify the occasions in which we sin not only by commission but also by 
omission: “by remaining silent, defaulting, dissembling, permitting, or endur- 
ing” the sins and crimes of an unjust ruler or institution. Again, he stresses, the 
obligation to resist injustice and to set things right obtains to the community 
as a whole. Factions or parties within the political community cannot simply 
shirk responsibility or shift blame to their rivals; all are codebtors before God. 
If anyone stands by while Jeroboam worships idols and slaughters the innocent, 
they partake in his sin—and his judgment. If we are truly going to claim popular 
political agency, we must also have a keen sense of our personal and collective 
responsibility for the shared life of the political community.
If Althusius is right about this, there are two related issues that must be ad- 
dressed. First, acts of resistance must be regarded as internal to the community 
itself. In other words, resistance arises from within the community, for the sake 
of the community. Such acts may be regarded as righteous and just only if they 
are duly authorized, and this authorization comes from the political community 
that God has called into being. If someone claims to be a liberator but does 
not derive her authority from the community or make herself accountable to 
the community, she lacks the authority to act justly on its behalf. The second
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related issue regards complicated questions about self-identity, mutual recog- 
nition, and the status of liminal persons who may not be fully recognized—or 
valued—by the communities they find themselves in. Whose voice counts in the 
community? I raise this issue here not to solve it once and for all but rather to 
suggest that Althusius’s discussion of broad-based political agency may be more 
democratic than he would have cared to admit. If everyone has a responsibility 
to care for the common good and to ensure that every other member of the 
community is also able to participate in this fellowship, then the boundaries of 
inclusion may be more expansive and more porous than Althusius himself may 
have realized. It is possible to see glimmers of this possibility in some surpris- 
ing niches of Althusius’s writings.31 The work that remains for contemporary 
Christian ethicists is to make explicit what was only implicit in the best parts of 
this strand of early modern thought. Protestant political thought is not a closed 
canon, and the heirs of Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Beza, and Althusius should 
feel authorized to direct the tradition toward new places and to address ques- 
tions that would not have occurred to their theological forebears.
There is a second implication of early modern resistance theory, which 
builds on the first. If the demanding responsibilities of political life are to be 
carried out faithfully, members of the community will need to find ways to 
cultivate a set of discrete political virtues to sustain these efforts. Early mod- 
erns like Althusius paid a great deal of attention to the virtues that must be 
in evidence among a people and its rulers if a republic is going to survive, let 
alone flourish. These virtues, Althusius argues, must be cultivated in homes, 
congregations, civic communities, and workplaces before they can do the work 
on a larger political or electoral stage. While it may seem quixotic to campaign 
on an exhortation to virtue—for good reason these days—I think Althusius is 
correct. Perhaps ironically, it is on this point that Althusius falls back on the 
wisdom of the ancients and the medievals: a rightly ordered republic, one in 
which all members are able to pursue the common good, needs virtuous citizens 
and exemplars. And what are some of these virtues? They include the prudence 
to recognize the difference between justice and injustice, the tolerance to live 
well with those we find objectionable, the piety to honor the people, institu- 
tions, and traditions that made us who we are, and the courage to sacrifice for 
the sake of fellowship and call tyrants to account.
It is also important to account for the flipside of this matter: all too often acts 
of resistance are undertaken by the vicious or those ill-equipped to rightly order 
the means and ends of these acts. Those lacking in prudence will misjudge their 
circumstances or the conditions needed for successful resistance. Those lacking 
the virtue of tolerance will not be prepared to respond appropriately to those 
actions or people they find objectionable. Those lacking in piety may become 
demagogues. Those lacking in courage will habitually conform to the demands 
of individuals or institutions that exercise undue economic power or social
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pressure. In many of these cases, vicious agents of resistance and their fellow 
social critics might turn out to be a remedy more pernicious than the disease.
If we are to recover this early modern doctrine of resistance for contempo- 
rary purposes, we need to take note of Althusius’s anxiety about the ways that 
resistance can go wrong. But at the same time, it is important to remember that 
righteous acts of resistance can often be identified by examining their primary 
ends and means. Do acts of resistance aim to preserve or restore the fellow- 
ship of the community? Or do they instead aim to shore up private goods and 
partisan interests? Are acts of resistance being carried out virtuously by repre- 
sentative individuals who act with prudence, courage, and charity? Or are they 
being carried out carelessly, rashly, and with ill intent?
These questions are not easily answered. And in a political context like our 
own, consensus answers will be even harder to come by. I find this reality 
regrettable—perhaps even cause for lament—but not paralyzing or sufficient 
grounds for resentment. The temptation to despair or to resort to some form of 
apocalyptic impatience may seem quite strong to us now. But insofar as politd- 
cal fellowship is still recognized as valuable, whether by our fellow citizens or 
by God, we have cause to hope. So long as there are those who devote them- 
selves to cultivating the virtues needed to live well with each other, to pursue 
just relations despite the personal cost, there is reason to continue to look for 
restoration.
If we want to repurpose an early modem doctrine of resistance for our own 
late modem troubles, this is where we must start: doing the hard, slow work of 
moral formation, correction, and confrontation. The work of virtuous, rightly 
ordered resistance could begin on the smallest of scales: in homes, classrooms, 
congregations, or similar civic communities. Perhaps from those seedbeds we 
will see the outgrowth of something more expansive. However, regardless of 
the context, we can hope to see the public work of resistance being carried out 
by virtuous citizens who recognize themselves as codebtors before God and 
neighbor for the common good of fellowship with each other. This invaluable 
good is something worthy of our attention, our struggle, and our sacrifice.
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